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Would you be willing to pay more for a 
new television the same day you bought a 
new house? Would you be more likely to 
purchase that television if it was marked on 
sale? Most individuals respond afﬁ  rmatively 
to questions of this form, likely because they 
use a “reference point” to help with evalu-
ating their options. A common example 
is when ownership of an item affects its 
valuation. This is known as the “endow-
ment effect”, demonstrated by individuals 
reporting a higher minimum willingness-
to-accept (WTA) as a purchase price for 
an already-owned item than a maximum 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) to acquire the 
same item.
The importance of understanding 
 reference-point phenomena like the endow-
ment effect has been reﬂ  ected in a sizeable 
number of related behavioral and theo-
retical papers. While some aspects of the 
endowment effect can be dissociated with 
behavioral data (Brenner et al., 2007), neu-
roscience can aid in delineating others. To 
this end, there have already been functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) explo-
rations of the endowment effect and its 
neurobiological underpinnings (Knutson 
et al., 2008; Weber et al., 2007). These stud-
ies, though, do not obtain fMRI data for 
within-subject comparisons of buying and 
selling the same items; a true measure of the 
endowment effect would demonstrate how a 
change in reference affected valuation (here, 
WTA and WTP). Given the large number of 
value comparisons that go into decisions, it 
might be the case that the brain determines 
“  relative” preferences using relative value 
scales instead of computing “absolute” pref-
erences (Seymour and McClure, 2008). The 
presence of one or more reference points 
during construction of subjective values 
could lead to the WTA–WTP disparity.
A recent study by De Martino et  al. 
(2009) seeks to ﬁ  ll this important gap, using 
fMRI to identify the neural valuation proc-
esses underlying the endowment effect. This 
goal, though seemingly addressing a speciﬁ  c 
economic phenomenon, reaches a broad 
set of neuroscience questions. Although 
the neural mechanisms of subjective value 
computation – particularly those involving 
speciﬁ  c subregions of the striatum and the 
prefrontal cortex – have been extensively 
studied, there remain questions about how 
these regions represent and integrate indi-
vidual preferences. Studies also implicate 
additional regions (e.g., insular cortex and 
amygdala) in the modulation and computa-
tion of subjective value, making it plausible 
that this set of brain regions may both work 
in concert and in competition to create 
value signals. If the brain does employ rela-
tive value scaling through reference points, 
then, it could be implemented via any subset 
of these regions.
In order to isolate this part of value 
construction,  De Martino et  al. (2009) 
used a task that matches a proxy for sub-
jective value, WTA and WTP, to a range of 
items: lottery tickets for money. Subjects 
were ﬁ  rst given £36 and asked to choose 
one of two decks of lottery tickets that 
were identical save for their color (red 
or green). Subjects completed a task with 
ﬁ  ve different trial types: (1) either nam-
ing selling prices for tickets from their 
endowed deck, (2) buying tickets from 
the non-endowed deck, (3) being forced 
to sell to the computer from their endowed 
deck at a pseudo-randomly picked price, 
(4) being forced to buy from the computer 
at a pseudo-randomly picked price from 
the non-endowed deck, or (5) reporting 
the amount they felt the tickets from a 
third deck (yellow) were worth.
This is an elegant task for eliciting valua-
tion differences. First, by presenting subjects 
with two sets of tickets that differ only in 
color, they made it possible for individuals 
to both buy and sell the same item while 
in the scanner. Second, unlike common 
binary choice tasks (e.g., accept/reject), 
the task obtained a reported value on each 
trial. Third, the computer trials served as 
their control condition: those trials should 
employ the same cognitive processes save for 
evaluating the gamble. However, it should 
be noted that subjects might still construct 
their value for a lottery on control trials 
(e.g., react to an unfair price on computer 
trials). Further research will be necessary 
to determine if the presence of mandatory 
choice leads to the absence of the relevant 
valuation processes.
De Martino et al. (2009) constructed two 
models to uncover indications of dissoci-
able value computations. The ﬁ  rst model 
identiﬁ  ed which brain regions had blood-
 oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) signal 
that correlated with WTA and WTP. There 
were several positive correlations, which 
dissociate orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) into 
medial (WTP) and lateral (WTA) compo-
nents, and point to caudate for encoding 
both WTA and WTP. The second model used 
measures of Δ-WTP (Δ-WTA), the percent-
age change in the purchase (selling) price 
relative to the values reported for the corre-
sponding yellow tickets. This model revealed 
a positive (negative) correlation between 
BOLD signal in ventral striatum (VSTR) 
and the posterior part of the putamen for 
Δ-WTA (Δ-WTP). De Martino et al. (2009) 
also reported an additional region of activa-
tion in insular cortex that demonstrated a 
negative correlation with Δ-WTP.Clithero and Smith  Reference and preference
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Because brain regions were sensitive 
to both components of the endowment 
effect in the second model, De Martino 
et al. (2009) conducted a between- subjects 
regression to track neural correlates of 
the endowment effect across trials. The 
analysis uncovered another region of 
VSTR, indicating that individuals with a 
greater endowment effect (Δ-WTA greater 
than Δ-WTP) had increased VSTR signal. 
Knutson et al. (2008) also quantiﬁ  ed sus-
ceptibility to the endowment effect, meas-
ured as differences in post hoc ratings of 
bought and sold products. This measure 
correlated signiﬁ  cantly with signal from 
right anterior insula, a result that was 
attributed to the salience of potential loss 
of ownership. Given the signiﬁ  cant differ-
ences in anterior insula for Δ-WTP and 
Δ-WTA, it is noteworthy that an analo-
gous effect for individual differences was 
not found for insular cortex. The endowed 
goods were in the same reward modality as 
the exchange currency (money), so the loss 
of ownership may not have been as salient 
(Brenner et al., 2007).
Some other recent ﬁ  ndings can aid in 
interpreting these results. One fMRI study 
of probabilistic choice (simple gambles) 
argued that the evaluation of risk is nonlin-
ear in probabilities, and that this encoding 
takes place in VSTR in isolation of choice 
(Hsu et al., 2009). Additionally, VSTR has 
also recently been shown to encode a risk-
independent measure of expected value, 
whereas lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) 
showed evidence for a subjective value sig-
nal that captured both expected value and 
risk (Tobler et al., 2009). Signal from part 
of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, in a 
region more anterior to that found in De 
Martino et  al. (2009), exhibits behavior 
that corresponds to money illusion, the 
common phenomenon in which individu-
als fail to evaluate money in terms of its 
actual purchasing power (Weber et  al., 
2009). And, as De Martino et  al. (2009) 
noted, WTP for small food items correlates 
with BOLD signal from a more posterior 
region of medial OFC (Plassmann et al., 
2007). These studies, as well as many others, 
point to choice parameters being encoded 
ﬁ   rst in either subcortical structures or 
more posterior regions of the PFC, before 
a more integrative value signal is com-
puted in anterior PFC. Thus, this gradient 
of abstract   representation may correspond 
to a gradient of different scales, leading to 
an appearance of reference-independence 
or reference-dependence. For example, an 
early parameter representation (e.g., prob-
ability) might have a speciﬁ  c reference point 
(e.g., 1/3) whereas a later value representa-
tion has a more complex reference point 
(e.g., available options).
The idea that different brain regions 
and different choice environments exhibit 
different scaling mechanisms is consist-
ent with results from recent physiologi-
cal recordings. Some work suggests that 
OFC neurons can maintain a single scale 
within a given behavioral context (Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2008). Simultaneous 
recordings of neurons in OFC, LPFC, and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) revealed 
neurons in all three regions encoded cost, 
probability, and payoff (Kennerley et al., 
2009). Single neurons that encoded two or 
more of these values were found in all three 
regions, and there were also neighboring 
neurons with opposite ﬁ  ring rate relation-
ships (positive or negative) to one or more 
of the choice parameters. So, reference 
points might not only be region speciﬁ  c, 
but might also be speciﬁ  c to one or several 
choice parameters. Reference-dependence 
might therefore be a general concept that 
includes many factors, including choice 
history, and may thus be dynamic. This 
would likely not only implicate regions 
found by De Martino et  al. (2009), but 
parts of the LPFC (Tobler et  al., 2009) 
and ACC as well (Kennerley et al., 2009; 
Rushworth and Behrens, 2008).
Several paths for future research that 
investigate reference points and value scal-
ing are apparent. De Martino et al. (2009) 
constrained the lottery outcomes to non-
negative monetary amounts; a generaliza-
tion of the current ﬁ  ndings would include 
identifying the neural differences between 
evaluating a positive lottery and evaluating 
a negative lottery, as well as how buying 
and selling affect those differences (Brenner 
et al., 2007). The authors also claimed that 
the insula activity is in line with a risk 
 prediction  error  (Preuschoff et al., 2008). 
This intuition would be strengthened by an 
additional manipulation of insula activa-
tion via risk changes within trial type, as all 
the lotteries here have a uniformly distrib-
uted payout of winnings. It would also serve 
as a (further) test of which value signals are 
modulated by risk (Tobler et al., 2009).
By grounding an exploration of the 
endowment effect in terms of value com-
putation,  De Martino et  al. (2009) show 
that identifying the neural components of 
subjective value construction can help in 
the understanding of a common behavioral 
phenomenon, the endowment effect. They 
break down the endowment effect for lottery 
tickets into two distinct value signals in dis-
sociable brain regions and track individual 
differences in behavior using the fMRI data. 
Thus, while the literature establishes that 
many regions encode elements of subjective 
value, De Martino et al. (2009) demonstrate 
that these regions may have different refer-
ence points when constructing those com-
ponents. Future studies can strive to identify 
both how the brain chooses reference points 
to implement value scales and how (and if) 
it subsequently abandons multiple scales to 
create a value signal that is common across 
a wide class of behavioral phenomena.
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